feat: close all windows when parked and a door opens

Ports WinClose's SWI69 window control as an opt-in foreground service that is
independent of ABRP: no token, no GPS, no upload cadence. The driver opening a
door while the car is in P at a readable 0 km/h pulses UP at all four areas for
five seconds, then STOP.

Only the parts that serve that one behaviour are taken. WinClose's speed and
time arming, configurable delay, warning beep, per-window modes and position
reads are all absent — the target car is a Comfort trim whose motors carry no
position sensor, so a close can be neither verified nor cancelled.

The pulse, the door edge detector and the eligibility policy are pure classes
with unit tests. STOP is attempted from a finally block on every exit, including
an interrupted sleep, a refused write and a sender that throws, because a pulse
that stops arriving leaves the motors wherever they were.

Guards worth naming, several of them learned from reading WinClose rather than
from the port itself:

- A wake lock spans the pulse. This fires as the driver leaves, which is exactly
  when the head unit suspends; without it the glass can stop halfway with no
  STOP sent.
- A fresh listener registration replays the door's current state. That replay
  seeds the edge detector instead of triggering it, or a binder reconnect while
  the door stands open would close the windows on someone halfway out.
- WinClose's 60-second cooldown, so reaching back into the car does not run a
  second pulse.
- The service stops itself on a non-SWI69 generation, and the switch is disabled
  unless the process holds system uid — only the unstable flavor declares
  android.uid.system, so a stable build could otherwise offer a toggle whose
  every command would fail.

This is the project's first write to the vehicle. README, SECURITY, AGENTS,
CONTRIBUTING and DISCLAIMER all claimed the app never writes; that claim is
retracted and scoped rather than quietly left standing.

Untested on a car. The feature is off by default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

SECURITY.md

@@ -15,8 +15,9 @@ was moving. A proof of concept helps; a working exploit is not required.
 
 - Anything that lets another app on the head unit read the stored ABRP credentials.
 - Anything that gets attacker-controlled code installed through the unstable updater.
-- Anything that makes the app write to the vehicle. **It should never write at all** — this
-  app is read-only towards the car — so any write path is a bug by definition.
+- Any vehicle write outside the explicitly enabled SWI69 WinClose feature, or a window
+  close that bypasses P/readable-zero-speed checks, exceeds its five-second pulse, or
+  fails to attempt STOP on every window after interruption or failure.
 - Telemetry that leaks credentials into logs, URLs or crash reports.
 
 ## What is not in scope
@@ -35,3 +36,6 @@ was moving. A proof of concept helps; a working exploit is not required.
   checks fail closed. The stable channel does not contain the updater at all.
 - The VHAL probe helpers, which enumerate the whole vehicle abstraction layer, exist only
   in debug builds.
+- Window closing uses WinClose's SWI69 CarState callback and VSM commands. Its service is
+  not exported, has its own opt-in switch, and holds no wake lock or alarm. It does not
+  assert that a sensorless window has physically closed or that anti-pinch is available.