Files
nilsandClaude Opus 5.5 a5db5604d3 Code review fixes: app 2.9.0, server 2.2.0
Telemetry no longer loses queued batches. The server drops a bad value,
or a sample without a plausible time, instead of rejecting the batch,
and answers 200 with what it dropped. The app sends only values inside
the server's ranges (speed as a magnitude, so reversing is fine) and no
samples before the head unit's clock is set.

Server:
- Pairing hands out and accepts a token only after the device is saved;
  a failed save leaves the request pending.
- A paired token serves only the installation id it was paired with
  (403 otherwise); the shared INGEST_TOKEN still serves any.
- Wrong-password lockouts and open pairing requests are limited per
  client address (last X-Forwarded-For entry), so a stranger cannot
  lock the owner out; a car starting again replaces its own request.
- ABRP forwarding skips samples stamped ahead of the server's clock,
  which used to stop it until a restart.

App:
- Settings written to plaintext during a keystore failure move back
  into encrypted storage; the stored installation id wins.
- The installation id is derived from ANDROID_ID on first start, so a
  reinstall finds its history; a stored or imported id still wins.
- The scanned config file is deleted after import (it holds the token).
- GPS stops while live telemetry is off or the server unconfigured, and
  pauses while parked and idle, keeping the fix the car parked with.
- Range estimates use the monotonic clock.
- One HTTP helper (ServerHttp) for telemetry, sync and pairing.
- Last Turkish strings translated; mise logs shows the NilsMG4 tags.

Grafana reads InfluxDB with its own read-only token (new grafana-influx
Secret, created by hand as described in k8s/README.md).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QLJfZQZeAKAwSqViTmLzki
2026-10-18 00:36:19 +02:00

371 lines
11 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// Pairing lets a car get its own ingest token without anyone typing it: the car asks for a
// pairing request and shows its code as a QR code, a phone opens the approval page, the
// owner signs in with the approval password and approves, and the car — polling meanwhile —
// receives a token once. Modelled on the OAuth device authorization grant (RFC 8628).
//
// Pending requests live in memory only: they last ten minutes, and the server runs as one
// replica. Approved devices are persisted (see Device) so their tokens survive a restart.
const (
pairingTTL = 10 * time.Minute
pairingInterval = 5 * time.Second
// Pending requests per client address, and in all. A car needs one; a client that opens
// more only crowds out its own, and the total bounds memory.
maxPendingPerClient = 3
maxPendingPairing = 1000
// After this many wrong approval passwords from one client address in a window, that
// address waits for the window. Other addresses are not affected, so a stranger guessing
// cannot lock the owner out. The global cap only bounds guessing spread over many
// addresses; it is far above anything a person types.
maxFailedLogins = 5
maxFailedLoginsGlobal = 100
failedLoginsWindow = time.Minute
// Unambiguous characters only: no 0/O, 1/I/L, so a code reads right off a car screen.
userCodeAlphabet = "ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789"
)
var (
errUnknownCode = errors.New("unknown or expired code")
errNotPending = errors.New("request already decided")
errTooManyFailed = errors.New("too many wrong passwords, try again in a minute")
errWrongPassword = errors.New("wrong password")
errTooMany = errors.New("too many pending pairing requests")
)
// Device is a paired car. Only the SHA-256 of its token is kept.
type Device struct {
ID string
InstallationID string
TokenHash string
CreatedAt time.Time
Revoked bool
}
type pairingState int
const (
pairingPending pairingState = iota
// pairingSaving: approved, and the device is being persisted. The car still sees
// pending, so it cannot collect a token whose device might not be saved.
pairingSaving
pairingApproved
pairingDenied
)
type pairingRequest struct {
deviceCode string
userCode string
installationID string
client string // address that opened the request
expires time.Time
state pairingState
token string // set on approval, handed out once
deviceID string
}
// Pairing holds pending requests and the known devices. The clock is injectable for tests.
type Pairing struct {
ApprovalPassword string
Now func() time.Time
mu sync.Mutex
byDevice map[string]*pairingRequest
byUser map[string]*pairingRequest
devices map[string]Device // by token hash
// Wrong passwords: per client address, and all of them together.
failures map[string][]time.Time
globalFailures []time.Time
}
func NewPairing(password string, devices []Device) *Pairing {
p := &Pairing{
ApprovalPassword: password,
Now: time.Now,
byDevice: map[string]*pairingRequest{},
byUser: map[string]*pairingRequest{},
devices: map[string]Device{},
failures: map[string][]time.Time{},
}
for _, d := range devices {
p.devices[d.TokenHash] = d
}
return p
}
func (p *Pairing) Enabled() bool { return p != nil && p.ApprovalPassword != "" }
func randomString(n int) string {
b := make([]byte, n)
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
panic(err) // crypto/rand does not fail on supported platforms
}
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
}
func newUserCode() string {
b := make([]byte, 6)
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
code := make([]byte, 0, 7)
for i, v := range b {
if i == 3 {
code = append(code, '-')
}
// 256 % 31 leaves a slight bias; irrelevant for a 10-minute code that also needs
// the approval password.
code = append(code, userCodeAlphabet[int(v)%len(userCodeAlphabet)])
}
return string(code)
}
// normalizeUserCode accepts what a person types: any case, with or without the dash.
func normalizeUserCode(code string) string {
code = strings.ToUpper(strings.TrimSpace(code))
code = strings.ReplaceAll(code, "-", "")
code = strings.ReplaceAll(code, " ", "")
if len(code) != 6 {
return ""
}
return code[:3] + "-" + code[3:]
}
func hashToken(token string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
func (p *Pairing) expireLocked(now time.Time) {
for code, r := range p.byDevice {
// A request being saved is finished by Commit or Forget, not expired under them.
if now.After(r.expires) && r.state != pairingSaving {
delete(p.byDevice, code)
delete(p.byUser, r.userCode)
}
}
}
func (p *Pairing) dropLocked(r *pairingRequest) {
delete(p.byDevice, r.deviceCode)
delete(p.byUser, r.userCode)
}
// Start opens a pairing request for a car. A new request replaces the same installation's
// undecided one; a client already holding maxPendingPerClient requests gets errTooMany.
func (p *Pairing) Start(installationID, client string) (*pairingRequest, error) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
now := p.Now()
p.expireLocked(now)
perClient := 0
for _, r := range p.byDevice {
if r.state == pairingPending && strings.EqualFold(r.installationID, installationID) {
p.dropLocked(r)
continue
}
if r.client == client {
perClient++
}
}
if perClient >= maxPendingPerClient || len(p.byDevice) >= maxPendingPairing {
return nil, errTooMany
}
r := &pairingRequest{
deviceCode: randomString(32),
installationID: installationID,
client: client,
expires: now.Add(pairingTTL),
}
for {
r.userCode = newUserCode()
if _, taken := p.byUser[r.userCode]; !taken {
break
}
}
p.byDevice[r.deviceCode] = r
p.byUser[r.userCode] = r
out := *r
return &out, nil
}
// Lookup returns the pending request for a user code, for the approval page.
func (p *Pairing) Lookup(userCode string) (pairingRequest, error) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
p.expireLocked(p.Now())
r, ok := p.byUser[normalizeUserCode(userCode)]
if !ok {
return pairingRequest{}, errUnknownCode
}
return *r, nil
}
func recentOnly(times []time.Time, now time.Time) []time.Time {
recent := times[:0]
for _, t := range times {
if now.Sub(t) < failedLoginsWindow {
recent = append(recent, t)
}
}
return recent
}
// checkPasswordLocked counts failures per client address and refuses a client while it
// has too many recent ones (or while too many arrive from everywhere at once).
func (p *Pairing) checkPasswordLocked(password, client string, now time.Time) error {
for c, times := range p.failures {
if recent := recentOnly(times, now); len(recent) == 0 {
delete(p.failures, c)
} else {
p.failures[c] = recent
}
}
p.globalFailures = recentOnly(p.globalFailures, now)
if len(p.failures[client]) >= maxFailedLogins || len(p.globalFailures) >= maxFailedLoginsGlobal {
return errTooManyFailed
}
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(password), []byte(p.ApprovalPassword)) != 1 {
p.failures[client] = append(p.failures[client], now)
p.globalFailures = append(p.globalFailures, now)
return errWrongPassword
}
return nil
}
// Decide approves or denies a pending request. On approval it returns the new device, which
// the caller must persist and then Commit (or Forget, if saving failed): until Commit the
// car keeps seeing pending and the token is not accepted anywhere.
func (p *Pairing) Decide(userCode, password, client string, approve bool) (Device, error) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
now := p.Now()
if err := p.checkPasswordLocked(password, client, now); err != nil {
return Device{}, err
}
p.expireLocked(now)
r, ok := p.byUser[normalizeUserCode(userCode)]
if !ok {
return Device{}, errUnknownCode
}
if r.state != pairingPending {
return Device{}, errNotPending
}
if !approve {
r.state = pairingDenied
return Device{}, nil
}
token := randomString(32) // 43 characters
d := Device{
ID: randomString(9),
InstallationID: r.installationID,
TokenHash: hashToken(token),
CreatedAt: now,
}
r.state = pairingSaving
r.token = token
r.deviceID = d.ID
return d, nil
}
// Commit finishes an approval once its device is persisted: the token now works, and the
// car collects it at its next poll.
func (p *Pairing) Commit(userCode string, d Device) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
p.devices[d.TokenHash] = d
if r, ok := p.byUser[normalizeUserCode(userCode)]; ok && r.deviceID == d.ID {
r.state = pairingApproved
}
}
// Forget undoes an approval whose device could not be persisted, so no token is handed out
// that would stop working at the next restart. The request is pending again.
func (p *Pairing) Forget(userCode string, d Device) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
if r, ok := p.byUser[normalizeUserCode(userCode)]; ok && r.deviceID == d.ID {
r.state = pairingPending
r.token = ""
r.deviceID = ""
}
}
// Poll is what the car calls: pending, the token (exactly once), denied, or unknown.
func (p *Pairing) Poll(deviceCode string) (state pairingState, token, deviceID string, err error) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
p.expireLocked(p.Now())
r, ok := p.byDevice[deviceCode]
if !ok {
return 0, "", "", errUnknownCode
}
switch r.state {
case pairingSaving:
return pairingPending, "", "", nil
case pairingApproved, pairingDenied:
// Decided: hand the outcome out once, then forget the request.
p.dropLocked(r)
}
return r.state, r.token, r.deviceID, nil
}
// Authorized returns the paired, unrevoked device a token belongs to.
func (p *Pairing) Authorized(token string) (Device, bool) {
if p == nil || token == "" {
return Device{}, false
}
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
d, ok := p.devices[hashToken(token)]
if !ok || d.Revoked {
return Device{}, false
}
return d, true
}
func (p *Pairing) Devices() []Device {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
out := make([]Device, 0, len(p.devices))
for _, d := range p.devices {
out = append(out, d)
}
return out
}
// Revoke marks a device revoked and returns it for persisting.
func (p *Pairing) Revoke(id string) (Device, bool) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
for hash, d := range p.devices {
if d.ID == id {
d.Revoked = true
p.devices[hash] = d
return d, true
}
}
return Device{}, false
}
// CheckAdmin verifies the approval password for the device-management API, with the same
// failure counting as the approval page.
func (p *Pairing) CheckAdmin(password, client string) error {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
return p.checkPasswordLocked(password, client, p.Now())
}